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Abstract. The problem of setting the reservation price in terms of a two-part tariff 
requires, subject to new prices, reducing the difference between minimum expenditure for 
the starting level of utility and nominal consumer income. This difference in expenditure 
can be translated into the area below a compensated demand curve. The compensated 
demand curve is not directly observable, so the reservation price in this paper is 
approximated by a change in the consumer surplus. For the case of heterogeneous 
consumers, a number of reservation prices exist. This paper will address error estimation 
in setting prices of a capital good and a service. The results obtained are demonstrated 
using a numerical example.  
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The two-part tariff is a pricing policy that enables a consumer to pay a fixed 
charge and a unit price [2]. It is common practice for paying utility bills, 
Polaroid cameras, amusement park fees, taxi charges and the like [9]. Pricing 
policies in amusement parks were the motivation behind Oi’s article (1971) [6, 
7].  
 This paper derives the solution algorithm for the well-known two-part tariff 
problem, formulated as a bilevel multi-follower program and approximated 
reservation price with the area left of the Marshallian demand curve and above 
the price line [1, 4, 5]. The upper level represents a monopolist who makes 
decisions about the price of capital goods and services with the goal of 
maximizing profit, whereas the lower level represents consumers divided into n 
homogenous consumer groups who make independent decisions about their 
expenditure and quantity of goods consumed with the goal of maximizing 
utility.  
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 In the two-part tariff problem, the consumer cannot enjoy the consumption 
of a service without the capital good, which has its price. Every consumer 
compares the fixed fee and the highest price he or she is willing to pay for the 
capital good. This highest price is called the reservation price and it is equal to 
the area left of the Hicksian or compensated demand curve and above the price 
line. They are unobservable in practice, as they require the utility to be held 
constant. Approximating the reservation price with the area left of the 
observable Marshallian or uncompensated demand curve and above the price 
line is useful. This area is called the consumer surplus. Existing literature 
usually starts from quasilinear preferences that neglect the income effect. This 
paper takes into account the income effect and the difference between 
uncompensated and compensated demand. In terms of representing consumer 
tastes, the CES utility function and error estimation are used to set the price of 
a capital good in the case of a consumer group.  
 
2. Model formulation 
 
To highlight fully the structure of the problem and the decision-making 
dynamics, the two-part tariff problem has been formulated as a bilevel multi-
follower programming problem [5]. In general, bilevel programming models are 
suitable for describing hierarchical decision-making situations. A decision maker 
at the top level – the leader – first makes a decision for a best outcome, i.e. 
maximizes or minimizes the objective. However, once the leader has made the 
decision, each of the decision makers at the subordinate level – the followers – 
will make their own decisions independently, thus endeavoring to optimize the 
objective. The leader cannot force them to do whatever is best for the leader. 
Therefore, when making the decision, the leader is to anticipate the reactions of 
followers, given that their choices affect the feasible choice and overall outcome 
for the leader. The opposite is also true.  
The two-part tariff problem is exactly this kind of problem. The decision 
maker is the monopolist at the top of the decision-making hierarchy, while the 
lower level represents consumers divided into homogenous groups, with each 
group characterized according to its income and substitution elasticity, and acts 
independently. The monopolist determines the prices of a capital good and a 
service, primarily to maximize profit. Once the prices have been determined, 
each consumer group independently decides whether to consume the good, and 
if so, how much of it. If the price of the capital good is less than or equal to the 
corresponding reservation price, a consumer group will consume the good and 
the level of demand is determined by solving a specific optimization problem, 
with the objective to maximize the group’s utility. In return, each consumer 
group’s choice affects the monopolist’s overall profit. Therefore, when deciding 
prices, the monopolist has to consider each consumer group’s reaction. 
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In representing consumers’ preferences, the starting point is the strongly 
increasing and strictly quasiconcave utility function, and the use of the 
composite commodity theorem to solve the following model of utility 
maximization subject to the given budget constraint [3,8], 
 








≥          (1) 
 The solutions to the above optimization problem are the Marshallian 
demand functions, ),( Mpx M  and ),( MpmM , and indirect utility function, v(p,M). 
The service price p and nominal consumer income determine the budget 
constraints.  
 Given that the consumer cannot enjoy the consumption of a service 
without the capital good which has its price, the dual problem of minimizing 
expenditure subject to the given utility level needs to be addressed, where the 
solutions are provided by the Hicksian demand functions ),( upx H  and ),( upmH
, and the expenditure function ),( upe . Given that )),0(,( Mupe  are the minimum 
expenditures that ensure a level of utility where the consumer does not buy the 
capital good, the highest price the consumer is willing to pay for the capital 
good or the reservation price is equal to the difference between the nominal 
income and those expenditures [5],  
 
 )).,0(,( MupeMp r −=             (2) 
 
The CES utility function is chosen to represent consumer tastes. Let n 
denote the number of consumer groups, is  the size of the consumer group i, iM  
the income of the consumer group i, iσ  the substitution elasticity for the 
consumer group i, c the marginal cost of a service that the capital good provides 
and let α  be a sufficiently large number. The monopolist has to decide the 
price of the capital good, cp , and the price of the service, p. The decision 
variables relating to each consumer from the consumer group i consider the 
quantity of service consumed, ix , expenditure on all other goods, im , and the 
reservation price, rip . Moreover, they decide whether or not to consume the 
good, iδ , where 1iδ =  if consumers from group i are consuming the good in 
question and 0 if otherwise. 
 The problem can now be formulated in the form of the following bilevel 
multi-follower programming problem [5]: 
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The monopolist determines the price of the capital good, cp , and the price 
of the service, p, in order to maximize his profit function F, as described in (3). 
However, when making the decision, the monopolist has to take into account 
that each of the n consumer groups will make a consumption decision 
independently based on their individual objectives and constraints, thus directly 
affecting the monopolist’s profit. A consumer group will consume the good only 
if the price of the capital good is less than or equal to its reservation price. 
Therefore, the monopolist’s profit comprises the sum of profits for each 
consumer group, where the profit for each consumer group i is 0 if the group 
does not consume the good ( 0iδ = ), or ( )ci is p p c x ⋅ + − ⋅   if the group does 
consume the good. Hence, ( )c ip p c x + − ⋅   is the profit for each group member 
and is  is the number of group members. 
Once the monopolist has determined the price of the capital good and the 
price of the service, each of the n consumer groups makes an autonomous 
decision on whether to consume that good while trying to maximize its utility 
(4). Therefore, the lower level consists of n independent optimization sub-
problems, one for each consumer group. Since the groups are homogeneous, it 
suffices to consider the behavior of one individual consumer for each group. A 
member of a group i has to decide whether to consume the good and the service 
offered by the monopolist, described by 
iδ , as well as the quantity of the service 
consumed, ix , in order to maximize its utility Ui as described by (4). The 
decision concerning the quantity of the service leads to a decision on the 
expenditure on other goods, im . The utility is maximized subject to a set of 
constraints (5) - (9). Should members of the group i decide to buy the capital 
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good, each of them has a remaining budget of c
iM p−  to spend on buying the 
service ( ipx ) and other goods ( im ), as shown by budget constraint (5). If the 
members of group i are not buying the capital good, than 0iδ =  and the entire 
budget is being spent on other goods. The reservation price for group i is 
determined in (6). Members of group i will buy the good and the service only if 
the price of the capital good is less than the corresponding reservation price, as 
shown in (7) and (8). All decision variables should be non-negative, as required 
by (9). 
 
3. Solution algorithm 
 
In general, bilevel programming problems are difficult to solve. Moreover, if the 
solution to the lower level problem is not unique, even the notion of a solution 
poses difficulties. Given the special properties of the two-tariff problem, the 
defined bilevel programming model for the problem in question will always have 
a unique solution. This section presents the algorithm for such a solution. 
A brief overview of the problem is given here. A relationship exists between 
the price of the service, p, and the reservation price rip  for each consumer group 
i, i=1,2,…,n. Given the price of the service, p, the reservation price for a 
consumer group i is uniquely determined by  
( )
1
1 11 1i iri ip p M
σ σ− −
 
= − + ⋅ 
 
.     (10) 
Furthermore, if the price of the capital good cp  is less than or equal to the 
reservation price rip of the consumer group i, consumers from group i will 
consume the good ( 1iδ = ) and the quantity consumed will be determined by 
solving the optimization problem (4) - (9). For fixed p, cp  and 1iδ = , this 
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            (12) 
If the price of the capital good is greater than the reservation price rip  of 
the group i, consumers from that group will not consume the good ( 0, 0i ixδ = = ). 
They will spend their entire income on the other goods instead (
i im M= ). 
The choice of the service price p determines the reservation price for 
consumers from each of the consumer groups, which in combination with the 
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price of the capital good, determines values of the decision variables for all 
consumer groups involved.  
Consider the monopolist’s objective function 
( )r
1





p p s p p c xδ δ
=
 = ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ∑ .   (13) 
Note that the monopolist’s profit is not a continuous function. Since group 
i consumes the good and therefore contributes to the profit only if its 
reservation price is less than or equal to the price of the capital good cp , and the 
profit function may have discontinuities in all cp  such that c rip p=  for 
i=1,2,…,n.  
Since a group’s reservation price is a function of p, the domain of p can be 








= +∞  with the property 
indicating that the groups’ reservation prices maintain the same relationship to 
one another in terms of being less than or greater than one another. In other 
words, an interval Ik is the maximum interval for which a permutation of group 
indexes πk exists, such that  
(1) (2) ( )k k k
r r r
np p pp p p≤ ≤ ≤    for all 𝑝𝑝 ∈ 𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘.     (14) 
Intervals Ik are obtained by finding the intersections of rip  and 
r
jp  for all 
i,j=1,2,…,n ,i ≠ j. If 0 1 2 10 lp p p p −= < < < <  are all the values of a service 
price for which some of the reservation prices are intersecting, then 
[ ]1, , 1,..., 1k k kI p p k l−= = −  and [ ),l lI p= +∞ . Figure 1 provides an example of 
such intervals for two consumer groups. 
 
Figure 1: Reservation prices as functions of the service price p 1rp 2rp  
 
For a given interval kI , k=1,2,…,l  and the corresponding permutation of 
the groups’ indices πk , the value of cp  will fall into some of the intervals ktJ ,  
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t=1,2,…,n ,where ( ( 1) ( ),k kk r rt t tJ p pp p− =   with (0) 0krpp = , or it will be ( )kc r np pp≥ . In 
case ( )k
c r
np pp≥ , it is true that  
(1) (2) ( ) ,k k k
r r r c
np p p pp p p≤ ≤ ≤ ≤          (15) 
hence, none of the consumer groups consumes the good and the total profit is 
equal to 0. If c ktp J∈ , t=1,2,…,n, then 
(1) (2) ( 1) ( ) ( )k k k t k
r r r c r r
t t np p p p p pp p p p p−≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  ,  (16) 
hence, the profit function reduces to  
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where Ft is a continuous function which increases depending on variable cp . 
For a fixed p, its maximum is achieved for ( )k
c r
tp pp= , where  
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Therefore, in order to find the maximum of the profit function (11) in 
interval kI , it becomes necessary to compare maximums of the following single-
variable n continuous functions 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
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( ) ( ) 1
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tpp  in interval kI  is given by (15). The maximum of the profit function 
(11) in interval kI coincides with the maximum of the function *
k
t
F  such that 
{ }*( )max ( ) max max ( ), 1, 2,...,kk kk kttp I p IF p F p t np∈ ∈≥ = .         (20) 
Therefore, the problem of finding the optimal service price in interval kI  is 
reduced to solving n well-known optimization problems of finding the single-
variable function maximum. The overall maximum of the profit function F is 
the maximum over all intervals kI , k=1,2,…,n, that is 
{ }1,...,max ( ) max max ( ), 1, 2,...,k ktp k l p IF p F p t n= ∈= = .      (21) 
By comparing the optimal values of all profit functions *ktF  over all 
intervals kI  the global optimum of the profit function F is obtained. 
Consequently, the problem of finding the optimum of discontinuous function of 
several variables F has been reduced simply to solving k·n single-variable 
optimization problems. 
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4. A numerical example 
 
Example 1: Consider a monopolist who has to determine the prices of a capital 
good and a service with respect to two homogeneous consumer groups, where 
the marginal cost of the service that the capital good provides is equal to 1. 
Group 1 consists of 4 members, has an income of 15 and its substitution 
elasticity is equal to 2. Group 2 consists of 2 members, where each member has 
an income of 40 and a substitution elasticity of 3.  
The monopolist has to determine the price of the capital good, cp , and the 
service, p, in order to maximize its profit given by 
( ) ( )r 1 1 2 2
0, 0




p p p p x p p xδ δ δ
≥ ≥
   ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅    . 
Given the prices cp  and p, each consumer from Group 1 will decide 
whether to consume the good offered by monopolist or not, and decide its 
quantity, by solving the optimization problem (4) - (9). The same is true for 
consumers from Group 2. 
First, intervals kI  are calculated. Figure 2 is a graph of reservation prices 
for Groups 1 and 2 as functions of p. They intersect for a service price of 
1 1.69p ≈ . Hence, there are two intervals, [ ]1 0,1.69I =  and [ )2 1.69,I = +∞ . For 1p I∈  
the following is true 
1 2( ) ( )
r rp p p p<  and therefore 1(1) 1p =  and 1(2) 2p = . For 2p I∈  
the following is true 
2 1( ) ( )
r rp p p p<  and therefore 2 (1) 2p =  and 2 (2) 1p = . 
 
Figure 2: Reservation prices as functions of service price p 
 
At interval 
1I  the following partial profit functions 11F  and 12F  are 
considered, where 
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At interval 2I  the following partial profit functions 2
2
(1)Fp  and 2
2
(2)Fp  are 
considered, where 
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Figure 3: Partial profit functions as functions of service price p 
 
Figure 3 shows the graphs of partial profit functions as functions of service 
price p. 
The global maximum of the global profit function F coincides with the 
maximum of the profit function 11F  in interval 1I  obtained for service price 
max 1.324p ≈  and is equal to 
max 44.844F ≈ . The optimal price of the capital good 
is equal to the reservation price 1
rp , obtained for maxp . Therefore, max 6, 45
cp ≈ . 
Both Groups 1 and 2 participate in the consummation of a good, Group 1 with 
respect to quantity max1 2.097x ≈  and group 2 with respect to quantity 
max
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5. Approximating the solution of the two-part tariff problem 
and numerical example 
 
In maximizing profit, the monopolist has to take into account consumer 
reactions. If the price of the capital good is higher than the reservation price, 
the consumer will not enter the service market. In the previous section, the 
reservation price was presented as the difference between nominal income and 
minimal expenditure, ensuring a level of utility that corresponds to the situation 
where the consumer does not purchase the capital good.  An analysis of the 
reservation price is given from another perspective and Figure 4 provides 
relevant information. Consider an initial point 0x  on an indifference curve 
),0(),( Mumxu =  encountering prices 0p and a nominal income equal to the 
minimum expenditure, required to attain the utility level ),0( Mu , ),0(,( 0 Mupe . 
Now suppose that the service price decreases to 1p . The following question can 
be posed: how much better off is the consumer now that prices are lower? In 
other words, what is the maximum income a consumer is willing to pay at a 
lower price. This maximum is the amount that instills an indifference in the 
consumer with respect to the old and new situation [8]. This value is called the 
compensating variation and it is equal to the difference between the minimum 
expenditure required to attain the indifference curve ),0(),( Mumxu =  at the 
new and old prices,  
),0(,(),0(,( 01 MupeMupeCV −= ,            (22) 








MupdeCV .                               (23) 
In line with Shephard’s lemma, the expenditure difference for a small unit 
price increase is equal to the optimal quantity. Therefore, the compensating 








H dpMupxCV .                              (24) 
If the initial price is higher, the area under the Hicksian demand curve is 
greater and closer to the reservation price. The intercept on the vertical axis is 





H dpMupxCV )),0(,( .                              (25) 
Given that the Hicksian demand curves are unobservable as they require 
the utility to be held constant, it is clear that the unobservable reservation price 
should be approximated to the area under the observable demand curves, i.e. 
the Marshallian demand curves or the uncompensated demand curves, 






Mr dpMupepxp )),0(,(,( .        (26) 
The approximation should not be greater than the reservation price, 
because the consumer group will not buy the good. Since the Marshallian 
demand curves require the income to be held constant, the only dilemma is 
selecting M for errors to remain within reasonable boundaries. 
 
Figure 4: The compensating variation and the reservation price 
 
 
Figure 5: Hicksian and Marshallian demand curves 
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If the expression ),0(,( Mupe  in the Marshallian demand function is 
replaced with M, the result is the demand curve illustrated in Figure 5 to the 
right. The goal is to reduce income as close as possible to the curve, Hx . In 
that case, there is a common point as illustrated in Figure 6.  
The area under the resulting red curve can be divided into two parts. The 
area filled with the red slashes represents the area not contained in the 
approximation, whereas the area represented by the straight red lines represents 
the area contained in the approximation. Naturally, the goal is to reduce income 
so that these two areas are equal and thus the approximation becomes 
equivalent to the reservation price. Therefore, how much should income be 
reduced? Below is an approximation for only one consumer group. The 
assumption is that the marginal cost of a monopolist is constant and equal to 1 
and that substitution elasticity for the consumer group is equal to 2.  
 
Figure 6: Approximating the reservation price to the area under the Marshallian 
demand curve 
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In the case of one consumer group, as the service price is equal to the 
marginal cost, the area under the Marshallian demand curve for the CES utility 
function is given by the following integral 
 
  (27) 
 
 
Table 1 below gives reservation price approximations for various income levels.  
 
M 10 7 5 
∫aprox 6.83 4.85 3.41 
Table 1: Approximating the reservation price to the area under the Marshallian 
demand curve 
 
The true reservation price for the given parameters is equal to 5. 
Subsequently, if the chosen income level is about 7, the error is small and 




This paper has presented a construction of a solution algorithm for the well-
known two-part tariff problem. The algorithm was formulated as a bilevel multi-
follower program, which approximated the reservation price to the area left of 
the Marshallian demand curve and above the price line. The upper level consists 
of a monopolist who decides the price of a capital good and the price of a service 
with the goal of maximizing profit, whereas the lower level consists of consumers 
divided into n homogenous consumer groups who autonomously decide the 
quantities of the good consumed in order to maximize their utility. If the price 
of the capital good is higher than the reservation price, the consumer will not 
enter the service market. Given that the reservation price is equal to the area 
left of the unobservable Hicksian demand curves and above the price line, this 
paper has sought to approximate it to the area left of the observable or 
Marshallian demand curves and above the price line, subject to conditions that 
make this approximation as accurate as possible. Existing literature usually 
starts from quasilinear preferences that neglect the income effect. This paper 
takes into account the income effect and the difference between uncompensated 
and compensated demand. The analysis precedes a numerical example for a 
consumer group whose tastes are represented by the CES utility function. 
Future research will focus more on the real assumption of the heterogeneity of 
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